Declassified in Part - Sanitized C		se 2014/02/03	3 : CIA-RDP96R	01136R001302330007-1 25 X1
Intellige	ence	,		25X1
	C/TFD/SOVA			

## **Afghanistan Situation Report**

25X1


16 November 1982

25X1



		٠.				
	•					
		AFGHANISTAN SI	TUATION REPORT	·		25)
	CONTENTS	·				
				,		
					2	25X
	INSURGENTS SHORT OF WE	APONS IN NORTH			1	
	A majority of	the weapons	were captured,	but some of	the most	
	importantsuch	as antitank roc	ketswere acquire	ed in Pakistan.	che most	25
	LUXEMBOURG GRANTS AFGH	ANS LANDING RIGH	TS		2	
					•	
		rmany, and the U	xembourg when its K.	landing righ	ts end in	25
	IN BRIEF			er e		,
		• • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • •	• • • • • •	3	
	PERSPECTIVE				•	
	WILL BREZHNEV'S DEATH	AFFECT THE USSR'	S AFGHAN POLICY?		3	
	Our initial jud	gment is that th	ere will be little	change in Sov	iet nolicy	
	in the near ter	m.		ondings in bov.	rec porrey	25
	This document is prepa	red weekly by t	he Office of Near	East/South As:	ia and the	7
	Office of Soviet Analy	S1S.				7
					·	
	<u>Publication Note</u>			•	25	5 <b>X</b> 1
	Unless major develo	pments warrant.		· · ·	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	25)
	report will appear on	30 November		The next	hard-copy2	25 <b>X</b>
	report will appear on	Jo November.				
			•			
<b>&lt;</b> 1						
<b>&lt;</b> 1		•				
<b>&lt;</b> 1		•				
<b>&lt;</b> 1				i i	ember 1982 82 <b>-</b> 10594CX	25)

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330007-1



ii

16 November 1982 NESA-M 82-10594CX SOVA-M 82-10179CX

	25	5)
INS	URGENTS SHORT OF WEAPONS IN NORTH	
	Jamiat-i-Islami insurgent commanders in Takhar Province clai	í m
	that weapons captured from Soviet a	ın
	Afghan forces continue to be more important than supplies from Peshawa Equipment lists on each of the 19 JI groups in the province show th	ıa
	although insurgents captured or bought most of their weaponsincludi over two thirds of their AK-47sall the mines, anti-tank rockets, a	in in
	heavy machineguns came from Pakistan.	
	ammunition is allocated to more numerous groups in the south with t	
	remainder given to northern groups. Shortages of ammunition reported limit the guerrillas to a few small actions each month.	11
	Timit the guerrinas to a few small actions each month.	
	•	

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330007-1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03 : CIA-RDP96R01136R00130233	0007-1,<1
	:
Comment: The insurgents appear to be able to acquire enough weapons in Afghanistan to continue resistance without outside support. Without the mines, rockets and machineguns from Pakistan, however, they would be	
much less effective.	25X1
Long supply lines from the Pakistani border to Takhar probably are the main reason groups in the north receive a smaller amount of equipment from Peshawar. They are probably better off to steal or buy local small arms and ammunition, however, and use the supply caravans to bring in	ý
heavier weapons and mines without which the insurgents would be less able to attack convoys or defend themselves against air attack. Insurgent acquisition of more automatic weapons, like the AK-47, ironically worsens the ammunition situation because such weapons tend to be used to fire	
bursts rather than carefully aimed single shots.	25X1
LUXEMBOURG GRANTS AFGHANS LANDING RIGHTS	25 <b>X</b> 1
According to the US Embassy in Luxembourg, Arianathe Afghan airlinehas been granted landing rights in Luxembourg. There will be two flights a week from Kabul with stops at Zurich and Moscow. The Swiss have told the British that they have not given permission for the stop in Zurich. The US and several Western European countries plan strong demarches to try to change Luxembourg's decision.	25X1 25X1
	23/1
Comment: A year ago, the UK, France and West Germany informed Kabul that Ariana would lose its landing rights in the three countries on 1 December, 1982. In July 1981, the Ottawa economic summit meeting had called for the suspension of flights to and from Afghanistan because of	
Kabul's "flagrant breach of its international obligations" during and after the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner in March 1981. Ariana tried	•
to obtain landing rights elsewhere in Western Europe, but its requests were rejected by the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and apparently by	*
Austria and Switzerland. Until the Luxembourgers granted landing rights, it had appeared that Ariana would have to give up its profitable Western European runsused by many Indians and Pakistanisand fly no further	Ļ
than Prague where passengers would have to transfer to other carriers.	
	25 <b>X</b> 1
16 November 1982 NESA-M 82-10594CX	₊25 <b>X</b> 1

SOVA-M 82-10179CX

2

057									•	
25X										
25X	e in the				•		,		IN BRI	
<u>(                                    </u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u> </u>								
new		nstructio	the co	dered	has o	Minist	Defens	-The Afghan	·	
new	on of 10	tals	l capi	ovincia	be at 1	ich wil		-The Afghan irfields, m		5 <b>X</b> 1
new	on of 10	tals is tryin	l capi ımably	ovincia nt pres	be at j governi	ich wil	ost of w	irfields, m		5X1
new ease	on of 10  ng to incr  garrisor	tals is tryin isolated	l capi mably and	ovincia nt pres convoys	be at p government to	ich wil . Th air su	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex		5X1
new ease	on of 10  ng to incr  garrisor	tals is tryin isolated	l capi mably and	ovincia nt pres convoys	be at p government to	ich wil . Th air su	to give	irfields, m		X1
new rease is by	on of 10  ng to incr garrisor  tps at son	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and	ovincia nt pres convoys	be at p government to	ich wil . Th air su	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex		X1
new rease is by	on of 10  ng to incr  garrisor	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and	ovincia nt pres convoys	be at p government to	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex hese towns.		X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  ng to incr garrisor  tps at son	tals  is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at page at page at the second seco	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex hese towns.		X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  ng to incr garrisor ips at son	tals  is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at page at page at the second seco	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex hese towns.		X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  ng to incr garrisor ips at son	tals  is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at page at page at the second seco	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, must ability pgrading exhaus.		<b>X</b> 1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  ng to increase garrison  ps at son	tals  is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at government to There	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, mets ability pgrading exhaus towns.		6X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  ng to increase garrisor  ps at son  2	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at j governi ort to Ther	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, mets ability pgrading exhaus towns.		5X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  ng to increase garrisor ips at son	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at j governi ort to Ther	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex hese towns.		5X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  Ing to increase garrison  ips at son	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at j governi ort to Ther	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, mets ability pgrading exhaus towns.		5X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  Ing to increase garrison  ips at son	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at j governi ort to Ther	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex hese towns.		5X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  Ing to increase garrison  ips at son	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at j governi ort to Ther	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex hese towns.		5X1
new rease as by ne of 25X1	on of 10  Ing to increase garrison  ips at son	tals is tryin isolated dirt stri	l capi mably and only	ovincia nt pres convoys are now	be at j governi ort to Ther	ich wil . Th air su rfields	to give	irfields, m ts ability pgrading ex hese towns.		5X1

3

SOVA-M 82-10179CX

·	·
ERSPECTIVE	
ill Brezhnev's Death Affect the USSR's Afghan Policy?	2
	2
	25X
As head of the KGB, General Secretary Andropov has been deeply involved on ll aspects of the Soviet Union's Afghan policy. We have no evidence he opposed he move or favors a radically different policy than the one now being pursued.	
ndropov said little about Afghanistan publicly prior to the invasion;	
fterward, however, he appeared among the more militant defenders of the move.	_
	2
Given his role in the decision to invade, we believe that Andropov does not	
hare the view that the Soviet Union has	_ 2
hare the view that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.	
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had	
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would	2 2 2 2 2 .
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.	2 2 2
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically	2 2
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically ver the next few months. This is the time of the year when the leadership has raditionally focused on Afghanistan and made decisions about altering policy.	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically wer the next few months. This is the time of the year when the leadership has raditionally focused on Afghanistan and made decisions about altering policy. For example, this time a year ago the Soviets were beginning the process of odestly augmenting Soviet forces there, in hopes of reversing a stalemated	2 2 2
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically ver the next few months. This is the time of the year when the leadership has raditionally focused on Afghanistan and made decisions about altering policy. For example, this time a year ago the Soviets were beginning the process of odestly augmenting Soviet forces there, in hopes of reversing a stalemated ilitary situation. The military situation remains stalemated and in the coming onths Afghanistan is going to be thrust back into the international limelight	2 2 2
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically ver the next few months. This is the time of the year when the leadership has raditionally focused on Afghanistan and made decisions about altering policy. Or example, this time a year ago the Soviets were beginning the process of odestly augmenting Soviet forces there, in hopes of reversing a stalemated ilitary situation. The military situation remains stalemated and in the coming onths Afghanistan is going to be thrust back into the international limelight y the Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi. The Soviets almost certainly will be	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically ver the next few months. This is the time of the year when the leadership has raditionally focused on Afghanistan and made decisions about altering policy. or example, this time a year ago the Soviets were beginning the process of odestly augmenting Soviet forces there, in hopes of reversing a stalemated ilitary situation. The military situation remains stalemated and in the coming onths Afghanistan is going to be thrust back into the international limelight y the Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi. The Soviets almost certainly will be oming up with some new position on a political settlement in order to minimize AM criticism of their policies. Andropov may have surfaced some new ideas when	2 2 2
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically ver the next few months. This is the time of the year when the leadership has raditionally focused on Afghanistan and made decisions about altering policy. or example, this time a year ago the Soviets were beginning the process of odestly augmenting Soviet forces there, in hopes of reversing a stalemated ilitary situation. The military situation remains stalemated and in the coming onths Afghanistan is going to be thrust back into the international limelight y the Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi. The Soviets almost certainly will be oming up with some new position on a political settlement in order to minimize AM criticism of their policies. Andropov may have surfaced some new ideas when	
that the Soviet Union has ecome too entrenched in Afghanistan.  The decision, in our iew, was made quickly by a handful of men, including Andropov, whose KGB had ailed to oust former President Amin in September 1979. Andropov subsequently ad to take some of the blame for underestimating the problems the Soviets would ace after the invasion.  Some changesprobably unrelated to the successionmay become apparent in he way the Soviets prosecute the war in Afghanistan or handle it politically	2 2 2

	for politic is unlikel transform Brezhnev's	over Afghanical advantge by that any Afghanistan successors leoffs and r	in the post contender into a cope with	st-Brezh r would full-flo Afghanis	nev period. argue fo edged Marx stan, the	In or aba kist S	these ondoning tate.	ircumsta the ea Moreov	ance, if ffort to ger, as
							٠.,		
	ិខ. ឃ				•		*		
					•				
	36								
	3₫. 23								
	១៩។ 🕟								
	la. Om								
	₩.						•		
			•						4
	•.			•					
			•	÷	,				
•	•	·					·		
					•				
				· ·				•	
								•	
								•	
		•							
			•						
							•		
		•							

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/03 : CIA-RDP96R01136R001302330007-1 25X1

Top. Secret